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Abstract: We extend the recent literature on the link between financial development and 
economic volatility by focusing on the channels through which financial intermediary 
development affects economic volatility.  Building on Bacchetta and Caminal (2000) our 
theoretical model predicts that the effect of real sector shocks on growth volatility is 
dampened by well-developed financial intermediaries, while monetary shocks are 
magnified, suggesting that, on average, there is no unambiguous effect of financial 
intermediaries on growth volatility.  We test these predictions in a panel data set covering 
63 countries over the period 1960-97, using the volatility of terms of trade and inflation 
to proxy for real and monetary volatility, respectively. We find (i) no robust relation 
between financial intermediary development and growth volatility, (ii) weak evidence 
that financial intermediaries dampen the effect of terms of trade volatility, and (iii) some 
evidence that financial intermediaries magnify the impact of inflation volatility in 
countries where firms have little or no access to external finance through capital markets.  
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1. Introduction 
Do economies with higher levels of financial intermediary development 
experience more or less volatility in economic growth rates? Do intermediaries dampen 
the impact of external shocks on the economy or do they amplify them through the credit 
channel?  While the recent empirical and theoretical literature has established a positive 
impact of financial sector development on economic growth, the potential links between 
financial development and the volatility of economic growth have not been studied 
thoroughly yet.
1  Still, the high growth volatility that many developing countries 
experience has brought to the forefront the question whether and to what extent output 
fluctuations can be related to the development of the financial sector.   
This paper tries to shed light on the links between financial intermediary 
development and growth volatility both theoretically and empirically.  Previous papers 
have found that financial development reduces macroeconomic volatility (Easterly, 
Islam, and Stiglitz, 2000; Denizer, Iygun, and Owen, 2000; Gavin and Hausmann, 1995, 
Raddatz, 2003).  However, none of these papers has tried to identify the channels through 
which financial development potentially affects growth volatility.  This paper examines 
whether financial intermediaries serve as shock absorbers mitigating the effect of real and 
monetary volatility on growth volatility, or whether they magnify their impact.   
Our work is related to three different strands of literature.  First, we build on a 
large empirical literature on the relation between financial development and economic 
growth.
2  Financial intermediaries and markets emerge to lower the costs of researching 
potential investments and projects, exerting corporate control, managing risks, and 
mobilizing savings.  Economies with better-developed financial intermediaries and   2
markets therefore enjoy higher growth rates.  This literature, however, does not explore 
the impact of financial development on the volatility of economic growth rates.   
A second relevant strand of literature has emphasized the magnifying effect that 
capital market imperfections have on the propagation of real sector shocks.  In particular, 
Bernanke and Gertler (1990) show that shocks to the net worth of borrowers amplify 
economic up- and downturns, through an accelerator effect on investment.
3   
A third related line of work is the literature on the credit channel of monetary 
policy (Bernanke and Blinder, 1988 and Bernanke and Gertler, 1995).
4  According to the 
credit channel view, monetary policy impacts the real economy through its effects on the 
credit market.  Through their impact on borrowers’ profitability, asset value and thus 
collateral, interest rate changes directly affect borrowers’ ability to borrow (balance sheet 
effect).
5  The supply of loanable funds is affected if banks cannot easily replace deposit 
liabilities and if banks’ assets are not perfectly substitutable (bank lending channel).
6 
This paper makes several contributions.  Building on a model by Bacchetta and 
Caminal (2000), we show that depending on their nature, shocks to the economy are 
dampened or magnified by well-developed financial intermediaries.
7  While real sector 
shocks, i.e. shocks that affect only nonfinancial firms in the first round, are dampened in 
their effect on output volatility by financial intermediaries, monetary shocks, i.e. shocks 
to the banks’ balance sheets, are magnified. Overall, our model does not predict an 
unambiguous relation between financial development and growth volatility, but different 
interactions of intermediaries with different sources of volatility. 
Second, we complement our theoretical model with panel estimations for a 
sample of 63 countries over 38 years. We assess whether financial intermediary   3
development, defined as outstanding credits to the private sector relative to GDP, affects 
the impact of terms of trade and inflation volatility on economic growth volatility. 
Specifically, we regress the volatility of real per capita GDP growth on our measure of 
financial intermediary development, the volatility of terms of trade changes and inflation, 
and interaction terms of financial development and both volatility measures, controlling 
for other potential determinants of growth volatility.  To test the robustness of our results, 
we split the sample period in different ways and use different econometric methods.  
Furthermore, we conduct a variety of specification tests.  Finally, we test for a differential 
interaction of financial intermediary development with terms of trade and inflation 
volatility for countries with developed stock markets, assuming that firms in these 
countries have alternative sources of external finance to bank finance. 
Overall, the exploratory empirical work gives qualified support for the hypotheses 
derived in our model. We do not find a robust relation between financial intermediary 
development and growth volatility.  We find weak evidence for a dampening effect of 
financial intermediary development on the impact of terms of trade volatility.  We find a 
positive interaction term of financial intermediary development with inflation volatility 
for countries where firms have limited or no access to capital markets, while we find no 
effect of monetary volatility among countries with well-developed stock markets.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple 
theoretical model and sets out the main testable hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data 
and the testing strategy. Section 4 discusses the main findings, while Section 5 concludes. 
   4
2. A Simple Model of Financial Development and Output Volatility 
  In this section, we describe a simple two-period model that builds on a model 
developed by Bacchetta and Caminal (2000).
8  Entrepreneurs differ in their level of 
wealth and therefore access to the capital markets.  Financial intermediaries arise due to 
informational asymmetries between lenders and borrowers. Unlike in Bacchetta and 
Caminal, however, we will model the financial intermediaries explicitly and will 
introduce a channel for monetary policy in the form of reserve requirements. Further, we 
will introduce two classes of shocks, real shocks that affect only nonfinancial firms in the 
first round, and monetary shocks that affect only banks’ balance sheets in the first round.  
Since entrepreneurs produce at different productivity levels, depending on their level of 
internal resources, real and monetary shocks will have distributional effects that will 
result in a dampened or magnified effect on output depending on the nature of the shock. 
 
2.1. The Real Sector 
All individuals in our model are consumers and entrepreneurs. Although all 
entrepreneurs have access to the same production technology f(k), they are endowed with 
different levels of wealth b. The fraction β  of agents are High wealth entrepreneurs and 
the share (1-β ) are Low wealth entrepreneurs.  Entrepreneurs can choose between 
different investment projects that imply different degrees of efforts and thus different 
probabilities of success. While High entrepreneurs can fully finance their investment and 
have excess funds, which they deposit with banks, earning a riskless rate r
D, Low 
entrepreneurs cannot fully finance their investment with their own funds and will borrow 
funds at the lending rate r
L. Due to asymmetric information about the type of investment   5
and effort entrepreneurs choose, and the resulting potential moral hazard problems, Low 
entrepreneurs face agency costs ϕ .  The relative marginal productivity of the High and 
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The higher the agency costs or the wedge between lending and deposit rates, the higher 
the ratio k
H/k
L and the larger the wedge between the marginal productivity of Low and 
High entrepreneurs.  Given the different levels of productivity, a reallocation of funds 
between the two entrepreneurial classes affects aggregate productivity and therefore 
output in the economy. The larger agency costs, the larger the effect of a reallocation. 
 
2.2. The Financial Sector 
The asymmetric information in our economy gives rise to financial intermediaries 
that can internalize the agency costs.  High entrepreneurs deposit their excess funds with 
financial intermediaries whereas Low entrepreneurs borrow from intermediaries to 
complement their own funds. Intermediaries operate in a perfectly competitive 
environment, face no costs and can only hold loans as assets. However, deposits are 
subject to reserve requirements imposed by the monetary authority, so that loans supplied 
to Low entrepreneurs equal (1-τ ) times the deposits of High entrepreneurs, where τ  is the 
reserve requirement.  There are no other liabilities and thus no other sources of funding 
for banks. We assume these reserve requirements are not remunerated and are not used 
for productive purposes.
9  An increase in τ , i.e. a monetary tightening, implies a decrease 
in resources available for lending to Low entrepreneurs, whereas a decrease in τ , i.e. a   6
monetary easing, implies an increase in loanable funds.  Financial intermediaries have 
thus two functions in our model: They arise out of market frictions and channel flows 
from High to Low entrepreneurs, i.e. from the surplus to the deficit sector, and they serve 
as conduit for monetary policy.  Aggregate loan supply of the financial intermediary 
sector can thus be written as: 
) 1 )( ( ) ( ) 1 ( β β τ − − = − −
L L H H b k k b       ( 2 )  
Since, as we show below, in equilibrium there is no uncertainty concerning 
repayment by borrowers, the ratio of the lending and deposit rate depends only the 
reserve requirement τ . 





       ( 3 )  
The asymmetric information and resulting agency costs lead to sub-optimal 
investment of Low entrepreneurs. As described in Bacchetta and Caminal (1996, 2000) 
and in the appendix, assuming certain functional forms for the production function, the 
nature of agency costs and for their level of equity, Low entrepreneurs will always 
choose the most efficient project, but will be credit constrained, in the sense that their 





− =ω ϕ , where ω  is 
a function of exogenously given technological parameters. The demand for loanable 
funds by Low entrepreneurs therefore decreases in r
L, ω  and leverage ratio k
L/b
L.  The 
supply of loanable funds by High entrepreneurs, on the other hand, is only a function of 
the interest rate r
D and reserve requirement τ .  
Our model thus combines the characteristics of a model with endogenous 
financial intermediation with conditions for the existence of a bank lending channel of   7
monetary policy: (i) firms cannot substitute bank lending with alternative sources of 
finance, and (ii) the monetary authority is able to affect the supply of loans.   
 
2.3. General Equilibrium   
Following Baccetta and Caminal, we embed the previously described partial 
equilibrium model of entrepreneurs and banks into a simple two-period overlapping 
generations model.  As explained in more detail in the appendix, the relative marginal 



























     (4) 
while the market clearance condition for financial markets yields: 












t k b k k b b − + − + = − + τβ β β β β     (5) 
Using these two equations, it can be shown that the relative investment of Low 
entrepreneurs k
L/k
H increases in the ratio of internal to total resources b
L/k
L and in their 
relative wealth share b
L/b
H, and decreases in agency costs ω  and reserve requirements τ . 










We can now explore the effects that different shocks have on the relative 
composition of investment and output, and therefore output volatility.  We will 
distinguish between shocks that affect only the real sector, i.e. the internal funds available 
to entrepreneurs of both classes and shocks that affect the financial sector and therefore   8
the external funds available to Low entrepreneurs. We are especially interested in the 
effect that the agency costs have on the scale of these output changes.
 11  
Consider an unanticipated shock (κ ) to the production function, that hits the 
economy during the first period, after all investment decisions have been made, i.e. 
yt=κ f(kt).  This shock can be caused by either improved technology or by lower input 
prices.
12 The profits of the leveraged, i.e. the Low entrepreneurs, increase more than 




t b b 1 1 / + +  and 
therefore relative investment by Low entrepreneurs in the following period. Since Low 
entrepreneurs produce at a higher marginal productivity than High entrepreneurs, this 
shift in relative investment towards Low entrepreneurs magnifies the effect of the 
productivity shock under imperfect capital markets.  The higher agency costs and thus the 
higher the difference in marginal productivity are, the more magnified is the shock.
13  
Result 1: The relative output effect of a shock that leads to a change in b
L/b
H is 
larger under asymmetric information than under perfect capital markets. The size of the 
output change increases in agency costs ω . 
Better-developed financial intermediaries alleviate the cash-flow constraint for 
Low entrepreneurs and thus dampen the impact of shocks to the production function.   
Note that these shocks only affect the demand for loanable funds, but do not shift the 
supply curve. Further, they affect banks’ balance sheets only in the second round, through 
shifts in the loan demand curve. 
A loosening of monetary policy through the decrease of reserve requirement τ  
increases the supply of loanable funds and decreases the interest rate r
L.  However, it also 
increases the leverage and thus the agency cost constraint for the Low entrepreneur.  This   9
partly offsets the positive impact of lower reserve requirements.
14  This dampening effect, 
however, decreases as agency costs decrease. Lower agency costs ω , i.e. more financial 
development, therefore, increase the output effect of monetary shocks.  
Result 2: The relative effect of a shock that changes the supply of loanable funds 
to Low entrepreneurs
 is smaller under asymmetric information than under perfect capital 
markets. The effect of the output change decreases in agency costs ω . 
Financial intermediaries thus have a magnifying effect on monetary shocks. In 
financially more developed economies, Low entrepreneurs depend more on external 
finance and therefore suffer more if banks’ balance sheets are affected by monetary 
policy changes. Shocks that affect intermediaries in the first round are transmitted into 
the real sector, and this effect is stronger for financially more developed economies. 
This effect is comparable to the credit channel of monetary policy, and more 
specifically the bank-lending channel. Unlike the theoretical literature of the bank-
lending channel that focuses on the imperfect substitutability of money, bonds and loans, 
we focus only on loans and on reserve requirements as monetary policy tool.  As in this 
literature, we focus on the distributional rather than the aggregate effects of monetary 
policy. Unlike this literature, however, we do not focus on the difference between the 
cost of internal and external finance, but rather on credit rationing.   
On the first look, Result 2 seems to contradict the results derived by the literature 
on the credit channel of monetary policy, that firms with higher agency costs are more 
subject to the volatility caused by monetary shocks. The different conclusions can be 
explained by the different variation we exploit.  Whereas the credit channel literature 
holds the degree of financial intermediary development constant and considers firms with   10
different degrees of agency costs, our model holds the variation of agency costs across 
firms in a given country constant and varies the degree of financial intermediary 
development.  Further, our theoretical model does not take into account other sources of 
external finance, such as capital markets, certainly an unrealistic assumption for many 
financially developed countries.   More financial intermediary development therefore 
translates – unlike in the credit channel literature – into more bank-dependence.  In the 
empirical part, however, we will qualify this simplistic statement.  
 
2.5. An Extension to Growth 
  While the theoretical model only considers two periods, we could extend it to a 
multi-period model. While we have only considered shocks and their effects on output, 
we can extend the analysis easily to real and monetary volatility and its effects on growth 
volatility.
15 First, we recast our model in terms of deviations from an exogenously given 
trend growth rate to control for different growth trends across countries that are not 
related to volatility. Similarly, unanticipated real and monetary shocks are recast as 
deviations from real and monetary trends.  Specifically, κ  is reinterpreted as deviation 
from κ , a trend productivity growth rate or trend growth rate in input prices; changes in τ  
are reinterpreted as policy changes that result in deviations from a trend monetary growth 
or inflation rate.  We can now summarize as follows. 
Result 3: The effect of real (monetary) volatility on output and growth volatility is 
larger (smaller) under asymmetric information than under perfect capital markets and 
increases (decreases) in agency costs ω . 
   11
2.6. Testable Hypotheses 
Our theoretical model provides two testable hypotheses.  First, it suggests that we 
should not expect to find an unambiguous relation between financial intermediary 
development and growth volatility, on average. Rather, the relationship should depend on 
the relative importance of real and monetary volatility in an economy.  An insignificant 
relationship between financial intermediaries and growth volatility, however, can be 
interpreted as evidence in favor of the model or as evidence against any role of 
intermediaries in dampening or magnifying the impact of real and monetary volatility. A 
second testable hypothesis is that we should not find an independent effect of financial 
intermediaries on growth volatility beyond their effect on dampening real and magnifying 
monetary shocks. Subject to correct specification, this is a more direct test of our model. 
In our empirical analysis, however, we will not test reduced forms derived explicitly from 
the model, but rather use standard cross-country volatility regressions, augmented as 
necessary.  This allows us to control for other determinants of growth volatility that we 
cannot capture in the simple model described above.   
We need proxies for sources of real and monetary volatility, affecting producers 
and intermediaries.  We will use the standard deviation of terms of trade changes to proxy 
for the extent to which an economy is exposed to real sector shocks and the standard 
deviation of the inflation rate to proxy for the extent to which an economy is exposed to 
monetary shocks. Both variables are certainly imperfect proxies. Changes in terms of 
trade affect producers and their balance sheets through relative price movements in 
imported inputs and exported output.  Terms of trade changes, however, affect only the 
tradable sector of an economy directly, whereas the non-tradable sector might be affected   12
only indirectly. Countries with large non-tradable sectors will therefore be relatively less 
affected by fluctuations in terms of trade. We control for this by including the ratio of 
trade to GDP in our estimation below. Also, inflation volatility might reflect not only 




3. Data and Econometrics 
3.1. The Data 
We use a sample of 63 countries with data for the period 1960 to 1997 and create 
three panel data sets by aggregating data over different time periods.
17  This serves partly 
as a robustness check on the results, and partly to avoid the problems caused by 
aggregating on unusual initial- or end-years.  Our constructed data sets are a three-period 
panel (aggregated over the periods 1960-72, 1973-85, and 1986-97), a four-period panel 
(1960-69, 1970-78, 1979-87, 1988-97), and a six-period panel (1960-66, 1967-72, 1973-
78, 1979-84, 1985-90, 1991-97).  We will focus the discussion here and in the empirical 
results on the three-period panel, since it provides the most efficient estimates of standard 
deviations (i.e. based on the largest number of observations). Table 1 describes the data 
and Table 2 presents correlations. 
The dependent variable is the standard deviation of growth in real GDP per capita 
within each time period.  For the three-period sample, this ranges from a minimum of less 
than 1% (France and the Philippines in the first period, Sri Lanka in the middle period, 
and Ghana in the most recent period) to about 11% (Lesotho in the middle period),   13
around a median of 2.5% (which is larger than the median growth rate for the sample of 
2.1% per year).   
Our measure of financial intermediary development is Private Credit, the claims on 
the private sector by financial intermediaries as share of GDP.  Private Credit measures 
the most important activity of the financial intermediary sector, channeling funds from 
savers to investors, and more specifically, to investors in the private sector.
18  It therefore 
relates directly to our theoretical model, since lower agency costs rely in higher supply of 
loanable funds. Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000) and Beck, Levine, and Loayza (2000) 
show that Private Credit has a significantly positive and economically large impact on 
economic growth.  Private Credit also varies significantly across countries, from less than 
1% of GDP (Haiti and Congo (Zaire)) to nearly twice the level of GDP (Switzerland and 
Japan).
19   
To control for the fact that firms in many countries have alternative sources of 
external finance, we create a dummy variable that takes the value one if the country’s 
stock market capitalization as share in GDP, averaged over the period 1975-1997, is 
above the median of the sample (13.5%), and zero otherwise. While stock market 
capitalization does not measure directly the share of firms with access to capital markets, 
we conjecture that firms in countries with relatively larger stock markets are more likely 
to have access to capital markets.   The lack of data on stock market development for a 
large number of countries before 1975 prevents us from exploring in more detail the 
effect of alternative sources of external finance on the relation between financial 
intermediary development and growth volatility.  We therefore rely on this cross-  14
sectional dummy variable to capture the extent to which firms can rely on sources of 
external finance other than financial intermediaries, specifically on capital markets.   
  We use the standard deviations of terms of trade changes and inflation over the 
corresponding periods to proxy for the degree to which an economy is subject to real and 
monetary shocks and thus volatility.  As indicated in Table 1, there is a large variation 
across countries in terms of trade and monetary volatility.  
In the multivariate analysis below, we include the log of real GDP per capita and a 
measure of trade openness, specifically the log of the sum of exports and imports relative 
to GDP.  There is considerable evidence that wealthy countries are more stable.
20    
Greater openness, on the other hand, increases a country’s exposure to changes in the 
terms of trade.  
Table 2 presents correlations for the 3-period sample.
21 We note that more 
developed countries, as measured by a higher real GDP per capita, experience less 
variability in growth, terms of trade and inflation. Similarly, financially more developed 
economies experience less volatility in growth, terms of trade changes and inflation.  
Growth volatility is positively correlated with volatility in inflation and terms of trade 
changes.   
 
3.2. Econometric Methodology 
To test our hypotheses we will run the following reduced-form regression: 
t i i t i t i t i t i t i
t i t i t i t i
CV Inflation SD FD TOT SD FD
FD Inflation SD TOT SD Growth SD
, , , , 2 , , 1
, , 2 , 1 ,
) ( ) (
) ( ) ( ) (
ε µ δ γ γ
β α α
+ + + × + ∆ × +
+ + ∆ =
, (11) 
where SD(Growth) is the standard deviation of real per capita GDP, SD(∆ TOT) and 
SD(Inflation) are the standard deviations of terms of trade changes and inflation,   15
respectively,  FD is our measure of financial intermediary development, Private Credit, 
CV is a vector of control variables, µ is a country-specific effect, ε  is the error term and i 
and t denote country and time period, respectively. 
  To explore the impact of financial intermediary development on the propagation 
of real and monetary volatility, we have to consider (i) the sign and significance of the 
interaction terms γ 1 and γ 2, and (ii) the significance of terms of trade and inflation 
volatility at different levels of Private Credit. A negative (positive) sign on γ 1 (γ 2) would 
indicate a dampening (magnifying) role of financial intermediaries in the propagation of 
real (monetary) volatility and would thus be consistent with our theoretical model.  
However, if variance in financial intermediary development is to explain cross-country 
differences in the propagation of real and monetary volatility, the overall impact of real 
and monetary volatility has to vary across different levels of financial intermediary 
development.   We are therefore interested in α 1+ γ 1*FD and α 2+ γ 2*FD, where FD 
denotes a specific level of Private Credit, at different levels of Private Credit.  Finally, 
our model would predict β =0, so no significant effect of financial intermediary 
development on growth volatility beyond its dampening and magnifying effect on the 
propagation of real and monetary volatility, respectively.  We also run regressions 
controlling for a separate interaction term of financial intermediary development with 
both terms of trade and inflation volatility for countries with well-developed stock 
markets.    
The interaction terms in these regressions are by definition correlated with their 
components.  This gives rise to the problem of multicollinearity.  While this does not 
necessarily bias the estimates, it does increase the size of the estimated variance, and,   16
given the relatively small sample sizes, may cause instability in the parameter estimates.  
Examination of variance inflation factors
22 reveals that volatility in terms of trade 
changes is the largest sources of collinearity.  In our empirical work, this might lead to 
the case where the parameter estimates on Private Credit and its interaction with the 
respective volatility measure are individually insignificant, but jointly significant. 
To control for biases introduced by the estimation of panel data, we use two 
different estimation strategies. The data combine cross-country and time-series, which 
enables estimation by conventional panel-data techniques, such as random- or fixed-
effects regressions.  These panel-data estimators are asymptotically normal as T → ∞, but 
in small samples, and especially when the number of groups exceeds the number of time 
periods, these estimators yield overly optimistic standard errors, and lead to 
overconfidence in the results (Beck and Katz 1995). Our base regression is instead a 
pooled OLS using panel-corrected standard errors, as suggested by Beck and Katz.
23 This 
allows us to correct for errors that are both heteroskedastic (that is, they differ 
systematically across countries) and correlated over time within countries.  While the 
parameter estimates are found by the conventional method  ()Y X X X ' ' ˆ 1 − = β , the 
estimated variance matrix is given by () ()
1 1 X X X X X X





= Ω , where E 
denotes the T x N matrix of the OLS residuals and ⊗  is the Kronecker product.
24   
Since the variance correction (weighting) matrix Ω  does not assume a specific 
time-series error structure, we conduct an ad-hoc test for serial correlation, by estimating 
a common serial correlation coefficient  ∑ =
i
i ir w r , where ri is the estimate of the within-
country serial correlation, and wi is a weight derived from the reciprocals of the   17
variances, which increases the efficiency of the estimates (Greene, 1993, p.457).  The ad-
hoc nature of the test is that we consider the test significant if the serial correlation 
coefficient is close to or above 0.3, the rule-of-thumb for correction suggested by Grubb 
and Magee (1988).  We find significant serial correlation only in the 6-period sample, for 
which we present both the OLS and corrected estimates using the Prais-Winsten 
transformation.    
We present two additional tests.  First, we present a likelihood ratio test of group-
specific heteroskedasticity, following Greene (1993, p.397).  Rejection of this test 
indicates that the errors differ significantly across countries, requiring the use of some 
panel-correction estimation method.  Second, we test for the endogeneity of Private 
Credit, and its interactions, using the Davidson-Mackinnon test of exogeneity (Davidson 
and Mackinnon, 1993).  This is similar to the Wu-Hausman test, with the null hypothesis 
that the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator is consistent with the instrumental 
variables estimator.  A rejection of the null indicates that the endogeneity of the 
regressors has a significant influence on the estimates, and that the equation should be 
properly estimated using instrumental variables.  We use as instruments dummy variables 
indicating the source of legal tradition, a dummy variable indicating commodity 
exporters, and the urban population share in the total population.




4. The Results 
This section presents the regression results from a 63-country panel, with data 
averaged over three, four or six sub-periods over 1960-97. We present three sets of   18
results.  First, we discuss results from a regression without interaction terms (Table 3).  
While this does not link directly to the theoretical model, it helps us relate our paper to 
previous studies on the impact of financial development on growth volatility.  We then 
present the regression results with one interaction term (Tables 4A and B), and 
subsequently on regressions with two interaction terms, specifically one overall 
interaction term and one for countries with well-developed stock markets only (Tables 
5A and B).    
  Table 3 suggests a large and statistically significant impact of both terms of trade 
and inflation volatility on growth volatility, while no robust impact of financial 
intermediary development.  The standard deviations of terms of trade changes and 
inflation enter positively and significantly at the 1% level in all regressions, while Private 
Credit enters negatively at the 10% significance level in two regressions (3-period and 6-
period OLS) and insignificantly in the other two. Further, the effect of real and monetary 
volatility is relatively large. If we take the 3-periood regressions, then increasing the 
standard deviation of terms of trade changes from the 25
th (0.04) to the 75
th (0.11) 
percentile results in 0.5 percentage points higher growth volatility (compared to a median 
of 2.5%), while increasing inflation volatility from the 25
th (0.02) to the 75
th (0.26) 
percentile results in 0.4 percentage point higher growth volatility. These results are 
consistent with our theoretical model, as we find no unambiguous relation between 
financial intermediary development and growth volatility. We also note that more open 
economies suffer larger swings in their growth rates, while there is no independent 
relation between per capita income and growth volatility.     19
  Tables 4A and B show (i) only weak evidence for a dampening effect of financial 
intermediary development on the propagation of terms of trade volatility, (ii) somewhat 
stronger evidence for a magnifying effect on the propagation of monetary volatility, and 
(iii) again no unambiguous overall relation of intermediaries with growth volatility. 
While the standard deviation of terms of trade changes enters significantly at the 10% 
level only in the 4-period and the 6-period AR(1) regressions and its interaction with 
Private Credit only enters significantly at the 10%-level in the 4-period regression, both 
terms enter jointly significantly at the 5%-level in all regressions.
27,28 While the standard 
deviation of inflation does not enter significantly in any of the regressions, its interaction 
with Private Credit enters positively in all regressions, and it enters significantly at the 
10% level in the 3- and the 4-period estimations; both enter jointly significantly at the 
5%-level in all regressions.  Private Credit does not enter significantly in most 
regressions – except for the 6-period OLS results – and together with the two interaction 
terms it is insignificant at the 5% level in all regressions.  
Table 4B presents the total effects of a change in the measures of real and 
monetary volatility on growth volatility, at different levels of Private Credit. Overall, 
these results do not prove that for a given country, the impact of terms of trade volatility 
is reduced as it develops better financial intermediaries; we cannot reject the hypothesis 
that the impact of terms of trade volatility is the same at the 25
th and the 75
th percentile of 
Private Credit. The results suggest that the impact of inflation volatility on growth 
volatility is increasing in financial intermediary development; there is a significant 
relation between inflation volatility and growth volatility at all levels of Private Credit,   20
and we can reject the hypothesis that the impact of inflation volatility is the same at the 
25
th and the 75
th percentile of Private Credit.  
To assess the effect of financial intermediaries on magnifying inflation volatility 
we consider differences in differences, i.e. the difference in growth volatility at 25
th and 
75
th percentile of inflation volatility and Private Credit.  For the 3-period regression, the 
effect of this change in inflation volatility on growth volatility is 0.6 percentage points at 
the 25
th percentile of Private Credit and 0.8 percentage points at the 75
th percentile. 
The results in Table 5A and B confirm the weak evidence for a dampening effect 
of financial intermediary development on the propagation of terms of trade volatility, 
while providing evidence for a magnifying role of financial intermediaries in the 
propagation of monetary shocks in countries with less developed stock markets.  As 
before, terms of trade volatility and its interaction terms with Private Credit are 
individually mostly insignificant, but jointly significant at the 5% level (Table 5A).  The 
interaction of Private Credit with inflation volatility is positive and significant at the 10% 
level in the 3- and 4-period samples, while the interaction for countries with well-
developed stock exchanges is negative, but not significant.  Inflation volatility and the 
interaction terms are jointly significant at the 10%-level in all regressions. Private Credit 
does not enter any of the regressions significantly at the 5% level, except for the 6-period 
OLS regression and it is jointly insignificant with the four interaction terms in all 
regressions.  
The analysis of the marginal impact of terms of trade volatility at different levels 
of Private Credit confirms our previous results that there is no significant difference in 
the impact of terms of trade volatility in countries at the 25
th and the 75
th percentile of   21
Private Credit; this holds both for economies with and without well-developed stock 
markets (Table 5B). 
There is a significant impact of inflation volatility at all levels of Private Credit 
for countries with less developed stock markets, which is decreasing in the level of 
financial intermediary development and significantly (10%) higher in countries at the 75
th 
percentile of Private Credit than in countries at the 25
th percentile in the 3- and 4-period 
regressions.  There is no robust impact of inflation volatility in countries with well-
developed stock exchanges – inflation volatility is insignificant at all levels of Private 
Credit.  
Summarizing, we find only weak evidence that financial intermediary 
development might dampen the impact of terms of trade volatility on growth volatility.  
Our results suggest a magnifying role of the financial sector in the propagation of 
monetary volatility on growth volatility in countries with less developed stock exchanges, 
while there is no robust evidence for an impact of monetary volatility on growth volatility 
in economies with well-developed stock markets.  There is no robust relation between 
Private Credit and growth volatility beyond the different interactions with real and 
monetary volatility. 
The results of a positive interaction of Private Credit and inflation volatility in 
countries with less developed stock markets are consistent with the predictions of our 
theoretical model, while the results for the economies with well-developed stock 
exchanges do not completely match the theoretical predictions.  This might be explained 
by the limitations of our model.  In countries with less developed stock exchanges, the 
capacity of financial intermediaries to serve as conduit for monetary policy increases as   22
the financial sector develops and the real sector becomes more dependent on external 
financing.  In most of these economies, our assumptions that banks cannot easily 
substitute deposits for other sources of funding and that firms do not have easy access to 
alternative source of external financing, might be appropriate.  In countries with well-
developed stock markets, on the other hand, there are two opposing effects.  While firms 
depend more on external finance in financially more developed economies, both financial 
intermediaries and firms have easier access to other sources of funding, such as capital 
markets, which reduces the effectiveness of monetary policy (Ceccetti, 2001 and 
Kashyap and Stein, 1995).   
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
  This paper (i) assessed the impact of financial intermediary development on 
growth volatility and (ii) explored two potential channels through which these two 
variables might be linked.  In our theoretical model financial intermediaries arise to 
alleviate agency costs and cash flow constraints on entrepreneurs, increase the efficiency 
of overall investment and dampen the impact of real shocks.  At the same time, financial 
intermediaries serve as conduit for monetary policy propagation into the real economy.  
Our theoretical model thus predicts a dampening effect of financial intermediaries on the 
propagation of real shocks and a magnifying effect on the propagation of monetary 
shocks. Depending on the shocks an economy is exposed to and the relative size of these 
shocks, financial intermediaries might therefore have an overall dampening or amplifying 
impact on growth volatility.    23
Our empirical analysis of 63 countries over the period 1960-97 gives qualified 
support for an interaction of financial intermediary development with real and monetary 
volatility.  We confirm the prediction of no significant impact of financial intermediaries 
on growth volatility.  However, we find only weak evidence for a dampening role of 
financial intermediaries in the propagation of terms of trade volatility.  We find some 
evidence for a magnifying role of intermediaries in the propagation of monetary volatility 
in countries where firms have limited access to capital markets, while no role is apparent 
in economies with well-developed stock exchanges.  
  Previous studies have found a negative relation between indicators of financial 
development and growth volatility.
29  In contrast, our results suggest that financial 
intermediaries have no overall effect on growth volatility.  This might be because 
financial intermediaries have contradictory effects on the propagation of real and 
monetary shocks, so that the overall effect is insignificant.  However, while these results 
are strongly suggestive, they do not provide unconditional proof.  We could not find a 
robust interaction between Private Credit and our measure of real volatility. This might 
be due to the weakness of our indicator (terms of trade volatility) or to limited relevance 
of this channel. Our measure of monetary volatility interacts with Private Credit only in 
countries with less developed stock exchanges. Finally, it is certainly inappropriate to 
generalize from only two proxies for real and monetary shocks. Future work might 
analyze alternative channels through which financial intermediaries have an impact on 
growth volatility. 
Our results suggest some general conclusions.  First, while well-developed 
financial intermediaries foster economic growth, they do not, independently, affect its   24
volatility.  Second, instability in macroeconomic policies, namely in the conduct of 
monetary policy, increases growth volatility, an effect that is magnified by financial 
intermediaries in countries where firms have no or limited access to stock exchanges.  
Finally, our results do not imply that financial sector policies are irrelevant to the 
volatility that economies suffer.  The ownership structure of the banking system, for 
example, might be important, especially the presence of foreign banks.
30 The integration 
of domestic with international capital markets might have an important impact on growth 
volatility.
31  Further, the regulatory and supervisory framework might have an impact on 
the extent to which financial intermediaries serve as absorbers or as propagators of 
exogenous shocks (Caprio and Honohan, 2001). Our empirical analysis should therefore 
be seen as exploratory rather than providing definite answers.  Our results should not 
discourage policy makers from pursuing policies that foster financial development.  They 
rather underline that financial intermediaries are not an all-cure.    25
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1 See King and Levine (1993a,b) and Levine and Zervos (1998) for correlation between financial 
intermediary and stock market development and economic growth. Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000), Beck, 
Levine and Loayza (2000), Beck and Levine (2003), Neusser and Kugler (1998) and Rousseau and Wachtel 
(2000) provide evidence for a causal impact of financial development on economic growth. Also, 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) show that firms in countries with an active stock market and large 
banking sector grow faster than predicted by individual firm characteristics. Rajan and Zingales (1998) 
show that industries that rely more heavily on external finance grow faster in countries with better-
developed financial systems. 
2 For an overview of the theoretical literature, see Levine (1997). For the empirical literature, see the 
previous footnote. 
3 Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) show that the interaction of investment indivisibility and the resulting 
inability to diversify risk increases economic volatility, while Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) show that capital 
market imperfections can amplify the effects of temporary productivity shocks and make them more 
persistent. Finally, Aizenman and Powell (2003) show that a weak legal system and high monitoring costs 
lead to a multiplying effect of real shocks on production, employment and welfare. 
4 See also the literature cited in Kashyap and Stein (1995). 
5 A number of papers show that liquidity constraints become binding for small firms in the U.S., which 
depend more on bank loans than large firms, after the Fed tightens its monetary policy.  See among others, 
Gertler and Hubbard (1989), Gertler and Gilchrist (1994), Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996), 
Kashyap, Lamont, and Stein (1994), Oliner and Rudebusch (1996), and Morgan (1998). See also the survey 
in Kashyap and Stein (1994). 
6 Kashyap and Stein (1995) and Kishan and Opiela (2000) present evidence for the U.S. that smaller banks’ 
lending volume is more affected by changes in monetary policy than large banks’ lending volume.  
Jayaratne and Morgan (2000) show that there is a positive correlation between loan growth and insured 
deposit growth in the U.S. and that this correlation increases in a bank’s leverage.  They interpret this as 
evidence for a bank lending channel of monetary policy.  
7 We thus abstract from other channels, such as risk diversification through financial intermediaries. 
8 For a detailed model development, see Bacchetta and Caminal (1996, 2000) and the appendix, available 
on request. 
9 An alternative way to introduce monetary policy in our model economy is by having bonds, i.e. assets 
with a safe return, but which are not a perfect substitute to loans.  Open market operations by the Central 
Bank would then affect banks’ bonds and due to the imperfect substitutability also loan holdings.  See also 
Goodfriend (1995), who points out that in the U.S. the decrease in deposits that follows monetary 
tightening is due to demand shifts. 
10 The effect of a higher b
L/k
L, ω  and τ  follows directly from eq. (4), as well as the result that the effect of a 
higher b
L/k
L is increasing in ω .  The effect of b
L/b
H follows from eqs. (4) and (5).  
11 We only consider unanticipated real and monetary shocks. Bacchetta and Caminal also consider the 
effects of other shocks, such as anticipated productivity shocks and shocks to aggregate savings. Agency 
costs, however, do not affect output volatility in these cases, so that there is no role for financial 
intermediaries in dampening or magnifying these shocks.  Finally, Bacchetta and Caminal assess the effect 
of debt issue financed with future tax increase on High entrepreneurs.  The debt issue and subsequent 
crowding out effect resembles our tightening of reserve requirements and its effect on output volatility is 
dampened by agency costs.  
12 Bacchetta and Caminal characterize this shock as productivity shock.  However, this can be interpreted as 
any shock that affects the producer, either on the input/cost side or on the output/profit side. 
13 This can be seen from eq. (4) by taking the derivative with respect to b
L /k
L.  The negative derivative 
increases in absolute terms in agency costs ω . See also Appendix B in Bacchetta and Caminal (2000). 
14 This can be seen by taking the derivative of eq. (4) with respect to τ .  Without agency costs, this 
derivative is unambiguously positive.  However, since leverage k
L/b
L increases with lower reserve 
requirements, a negative term is added to the derivative that increases in agency costs ω.  
15 Growth volatility can certainly be seen as an indicator of real volatility.  However, we are interested in 
“exogenous” determinants of growth volatility, specifically stemming from real and monetary sources.   30
                                                                                                                                                                             
16 We also considered other proxies for shocks, but data limitation prevented us from using them.  Data on 
productivity shocks are not available for a broad cross-section of countries.  Interest rate data would be a 
policy variable closer to our model.  However, many if not most developing countries did not use interest 
rates as monetary policy tool, but rather suppressed interest rates artificially with the result of negative real 
interest rates in many countries.  This would also require that we develop and include a set of historical 
indicators for quantity restrictions in capital markets, which is outside the scope of our inquiry. 
17 See Appendix Table 1 for the list of countries.  We restrict the set of countries to those that have at least 
8, 5, and 3 observations in the 3, 4, and 6-period samples, respectively.  See Appendix Table 2 for data 
sources. 
18 Private Credit includes credit by both government-owned and private intermediaries.  It would be 
preferable to focus on private banks.  Times-series data on ownership structure of banks are, however, not 
available.    Further, using data from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2002), Beck and Levine 
(2002) calculate a modified measure of Private Credit that only includes private banks for the period 1980-
90.  The correlation between Private Credit and the modified measure is over 90%.  
19 To control for potential non-linearity in the relation between growth volatility and financial intermediary 
development, we include Private Credit in logs in the regressions. 
20 Easterly, Islam and Stiglitz (2000), for example, show that the standard deviation of growth in non-
OECD countries is more than twice that in OECD countries. 
21 The correlations for the other two samples yield very similar conclusions and are available on request. 





j is the multiple correlation coefficient from a regression of Xj on all other elements of X.  A 
common rule of thumb is to be concerned with any value larger than 10. 
23 We also tested the sensitivity of our findings to using a fixed effects model with country and time 
dummies.  The fixed-effects results provide stronger support for our argument, especially concerning the 
interaction of terms of trade volatility and intermediaries and are estimated with apparently greater 
precision than the results we report below.  However, we believe these fixed-effects results cannot be 
trusted, for the reasons given by Beck and Katz (1995). 
24 This is similar to the Huber-White cluster (sandwich) error correction  ( () () ∑ = Ω
i
i j j i x x ε ε ), but 
while that method controls for differences in errors across groups, it does not allow for correlation within 
groups. 
25 There is a large literature showing the relationship between financial development and legal origin (La 
Porta et al. 1997, 1998, Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2003).  Further, there is evidence that 
endowment also influences institutional development, including financial development (Easterly and 
Levine, 2003, Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2003). Finally, all these instrumental variables enter 
significantly in a regression of Private Credit in all samples, and explain jointly about 50% of variation.  
26 We also test for endogeneity of the stock market dummy and cannot reject exogeneity. 
27 As discussed above, finding individual insignificance and joint significance can be explained by the high 
multicollinearity of the individual variables. 
28 To control for the different degree with which countries are exposed to terms of trade volatility, we also 
ran regressions with a triple interaction of terms of trade volatility, Private Credit and trade openness, the 
three variables and the three bi-variate interactions. The triple interaction term did not enter significantly.  
29 We are not able to determine why our findings differ from other studies, since we use different dependent 
variables, a different measure of financial development and different econometric technique, each of which 
can explain the difference to other studies. 
30 For the effect of foreign banks on banking sector stability, see for example Peek and Rosengreen (2000) 
and Crystal, Dages and Goldberg (2001). 
31 See Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2002) who find a dampening impact of stock market liberalization 
on growth volatility for the period 1980-97. Table 1:  Descriptive Statistics
Standard 
Sample Variable Median Mean deviation Minimum Maximum countries observations
3-period 63 169
Sd GDP growth (x 100) 2.539 3.351 1.964 0.634 10.968
Real GDP per capita 3,068 8,161 9,647 135 43,886
Openess 50.127 60.561 46.323 9.432 364.052
Private credit 0.274 0.418 0.357 0.010 1.961
Stock market 0.000 0.492 0.504 0.000 1.000
Sd ToT changes 0.064 0.083 0.070 0.000 0.407
Sd inflation 0.036 0.093 0.217 0.006 1.619
4-period 63 218
Sd GDP growth (x 100) 2.519 3.244 1.972 0.507 11.573
Real GDP per capita 2,803 8,331 9,703 159 44,223
Openess 51.058 60.879 44.652 9.903 378.472
Private credit 0.279 0.425 0.357 0.008 2.006
Stock market 0.000 0.492 0.504 0.000 1.000
Sd ToT changes 0.055 0.081 0.071 0.000 0.472
Sd inflation 0.038 0.086 0.203 0.005 1.625
6-period 63 333
Sd GDP growth (x 100) 2.392 3.125 2.146 0.432 13.529
Real GDP per capita 2,802 8,201 9,640 151 44,026
Openess 50.807 60.751 46.711 9.129 395.609
Private credit 0.284 0.418 0.358 0.003 2.043
Stock market 0.000 0.492 0.504 0.000 1.000
Sd ToT changes 0.053 0.080 0.078 0.000 0.577
Sd inflation 0.029 0.073 0.173 0.004 1.602
Sd GDP growth = standard deviation of annual GDP per capita growth rates
Real GDP per capita = real GDP per capita averaged over the sample period
Openess = real exports and imports as share of real GDP
Private credit = claims on nonfinancial private sector by financial institutions as share of GDP
Stock market = dummy variable that takes on value one if market capitalization as share of GDP averaged over 1975 - 97 is higher than the sample median (13.5%), zero otherwise
Sd ToT changes = standard deviation of annual terms of trade changes
Sd inflation = standard deviation of annual inflation ratesTable 2:  Correlations, 1960-97, 3-period sample
Variable
Correlations
Real GDP per capita
Private credit 0.784 ***
Stock market 0.431 *** 0.4771 ***
Openess 0.106 0.170 ** 0.159 **
Sd ToT changes -0.473 *** -0.470 *** -0.337 *** -0.249 ***
Sd inflation -0.162 ** -0.233 *** -0.179 ** -0.151 * 0.210 ***
Sd GDP growth -0.417 *** -0.395 *** -0.268 *** 0.034 0.434 *** 0.287 ***
Sd GDP growth = standard deviation of annual GDP per capita growth rates
Real GDP per capita = real GDP per capita averaged over the sample period
Openess = real exports and imports as share of real GDP
Private credit = claims on nonfinancial private sector by financial institutions as share of GDP
Sd ToT changes = standard deviation of annual terms of trade changes
Sd inflation = standard deviation of annual inflation rates
Real GDP per capita Private credit Openness Sd ToT changes Sd inflation Stock marketTable 3: Terms of Trade and Inflation Volatility, Financial Intermediaries,
and Growth Volatility
Dependent variable: Standard deviation of growth in real per capita GDP (x 100)
Sample 3-period 4-period
Method 1/ OLS OLS OLS AR(1)
[1] Ln(Real GDP per capita) -0.1496 -0.1642 -0.1405 -0.0032
(0.263)                  (0.142)                  (0.175)                  (0.979)                 
[2] Ln(Openess) 0.6930 0.6465 0.5219 0.9369
(0.001)                  (0.001)                  (0.004)                  (0.000)                 
[3] Sd dToT 7.3942 10.0246 6.7336 8.3372
(0.003)                  (0.000)                  (0.000)                  (0.000)                 
[4] Sd Inflation 1.7157 1.8842 1.7926 1.8803
(0.007)                  (0.007)                  (0.008)                  (0.009)                 
[5] Ln(Private credit) -0.4621 -0.1772 -0.3877 -0.3793
(0.072)                  (0.434)                  (0.057)                  (0.119)                 
[6] Intercept 2.6265 1.6661 2.8513 -0.0491
(0.017)                  (0.114)                  (0.002)                  (0.949)                 
LR test of homoscedasticity 425.80 1127.22 2425.12 2677.32
Chi-squared (62 df) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Exogeneity test 2/ 0.65 0.11 1.16 0.50
 F(1, NT-10) (0.421) (0.738) (0.283)                  (0.481)                 
Estimated serial correlation (rho)  (0.13) (0.14) (0.27)
Number of countries 63 63 63 63
Number of observations 169 218 333 333
Notes
1/ P-values in parentheses
2/ Davidson-Mackinnon test
6-period                 Table 4A: Terms of Trade and Inflation Volatility, Financial Intermediaries,
and Growth Volatility; One Interaction
Dependent variable: Standard deviation of growth in real per capita GDP (x 100)
Sample 3-period 4-period
Method 1/ OLS OLS OLS AR(1)
[1] Ln(Real GDP per capita) -0.1670 -0.1913 -0.1277 -0.0062
(0.204)                  (0.082)                  (0.217)                  (0.960)                 
[2] Ln(Openess) 0.7290 0.6792 0.5392 0.9383
(0.001)                  (0.001)                  (0.003)                  (0.000)                 
[3] Sd dToT 12.9930 17.6936 6.5052 9.9797
(0.140)                  (0.000)                  (0.207)                  (0.057)                 
[4] Sd Inflation 0.0170 -0.0701 0.8694 1.0630
(0.987)                  (0.945)                  (0.370)                  (0.246)                 
[5] Sd dToT * Ln(Private credit) -2.2050 -3.0720 0.0527 -0.7072
(0.456)                  (0.086)                  (0.977)                  (0.710)                 
[6] Sd Inflation * Ln(Private credit) 0.8450 0.9403 0.4538 0.4118
(0.076)                  (0.034)                  (0.222)                  (0.257)                 
[7] Ln(Private credit) -0.3850 -0.0435 -0.4580 -0.3865
(0.216)                  (0.853)                  (0.049)                  (0.154)                 
[8] Intercept 2.3910 1.3645 2.9047 -0.0047
(0.041)                  (0.186)                  (0.002)                  (0.995)                 
Joint significance tests (Chi-squared)
[3] and [5] (2 df) 7.95 36.36 14.44 20.97
(0.019)                  (0.000)                  (0.001)                  (0.000)                 
[4] and [6] (2 df) 9.09 9.80 7.51 6.71
(0.011)                  (0.007)                  (0.023)                  (0.035)                 
[5], [6], and [7] (3 df) 6.74 6.06 5.62 3.60
(0.081)                  (0.109)                  (0.132)                  (0.309)                 
LR test of homoscedasticity 428.46 1393.62 2397.91 2570.72
Chi-squared (62 df) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Exogeneity test 2/ 0.49 0.30 1.02 0.66
 F(2, NT-10) (0.690) (0.826) (0.386)                  (0.580)                 
Estimated serial correlation (rho)  (0.13) (0.13) (0.27)
Number of countries 63 63 63 63
Number of observations 169 218 333 333
Notes
1/ P-values in parentheses
2/ Davidson-Mackinnon test
6-period                 Table 4B: Partial Derivatives: Marginal Impact of Terms of Trade and Inflation 
Volatility and Financial Intermediaries on Growth Volatility (from Table 4A)
Sample 3-period 4-period
Method 1/ OLS OLS OLS AR(1)
25th %ile financial development 6.66 8.88 6.65 8.00
(0.007)                  (0.000)                  (0.000)                  (0.000)                 
50th %ile financial development 5.70 7.47 6.68 7.61
(0.042)                  (0.002)                  (0.002)                  (0.001)                 
75th %ile financial development 4.11 5.20 6.72 7.09
(0.333)                  (0.132)                  (0.034)                  (0.034)                 
Test of equality of impacts at 25th and
75th percentiles (p-value) (0.456)                  (0.086)                  (0.977)                  (0.710)                 
25th %ile financial development 2.45 2.63 2.14 2.22
(0.003)                  (0.002)                  (0.006)                  (0.010)                 
50th %ile financial development 2.81 3.06 2.39 2.44
(0.003)                  (0.002)                  (0.008)                  (0.013)                 
75th %ile financial development 3.42 3.75 2.73 2.75
(0.006)                  (0.002)                  (0.012)                  (0.020)                 
Test of equality of impacts at 25th and
75th percentiles (p-value) (0.076)                  (0.034)                  (0.222)                  (0.257)                 
Notes
1/ P-values in parentheses
Impact of terms of trade volatility on growth 
volatility
Impact of inflation volatility on growth volatility
6-period                 Table 5A: Terms of Trade and Inflation Volatility, Financial Intermediaries, 
and Growth Volatility; Two Interactions
Dependent variable: Standard deviation of growth in real per capita GDP (x 100)
Sample 3-period 4-period
Method 1/ OLS OLS OLS AR(1)
[1] Ln(Real GDP per capita) -0.1852 -0.2098 -0.1424 -0.0134
(0.153)                  (0.058)                  (0.168)                  (0.913)                 
[2] Ln(Openess) 0.7503 0.6930 0.5475 0.9306
(0.001)                  (0.001)                  (0.003)                  (0.000)                 
[3] Sd dToT 15.3045 18.9817 7.3370 10.2524
(0.095)                  (0.000)                  (0.171)                  (0.062)                 
[4] Sd Inflation -0.2516 -0.2862 0.7209 1.0035
(0.816)                  (0.788)                  (0.476)                  (0.290)                 
[5] Sd dToT * Ln(Private credit) -3.3889 -3.8591 -0.4944 -0.8976
(0.295)                  (0.060)                  (0.808)                  (0.674)                 
[6] Sd dToT * Ln(Private credit) * Stock Market 1.5317 1.0148 0.7884 0.2548
(0.212)                  (0.339)                  (0.416)                  (0.813)                 
[7] Sd Inflation * Ln(Private credit) 0.9965 1.0594 0.5297 0.4264
(0.063)                  (0.033)                  (0.209)                  (0.290)                 
[8] Sd Inflation * Ln(Private credit) * Stock Market -0.2505 -0.2129 -0.0418 0.0780
(0.708)                  (0.773)                  (0.953)                  (0.923)                 
[9] Ln(Private credit) -0.3853 -0.0439 -0.4612 -0.3893
(0.211)                  (0.852)                  (0.047)                  (0.150)                 
[11] Intercept 2.4005 1.4474 2.9817 0.067
(0.036)                  (0.156)                  (0.001)                  (0.931)                 
Joint significance tests (Chi-squared)
[3], [5], and [6] (3 df) 9.80 38.46 15.40 20.90
(0.020)                  (0.000)                  (0.002)                  (0.000)                 
[4], [7], and [8] (3 df) 9.23 9.94 7.61 6.73
(0.026)                  (0.019)                  (0.055)                  (0.081)                 
[5], [6], [7], [8], and [9] (5 df) 7.62 6.49 6.10 3.72
(0.178)                  (0.261)                  (0.296)                  (0.591)                 
LR test of homoscedasticity 515.19 1166.69 2346.30 2585.61
Chi-squared (62 df) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Exogeneity test 2/ 0.79 0.33 0.90 1.30
 F(3, NT-11) (0.562)                  (0.892)                  (0.482)                  (0.264)                 
Estimated serial correlation (rho)  (0.15) (0.12) (0.26)
Number of countries 63 63 63 63
Number of observations 169 218 333 333
Notes
1/ P-values in parentheses
2/ Davidson-Mackinnon test
6-period                 Table 5B: Partial Derivatives: Marginal Impact of Terms of Trade and Inflation 
Volatility and Financial Intermediaries on Growth Volatility (from Table 5A)
Sample 3-period 4-period
Method 1/ OLS OLS OLS AR(1)
25th %ile financial development 5.57 7.91 5.95 7.74
(0.031)                  (0.000)                  (0.003)                  (0.000)                 
50th %ile financial development 4.10 6.14 5.68 7.25
(0.197)                  (0.031)                  (0.028)                  (0.010)                 
75th %ile financial development 1.65 3.29 5.31 6.58
(0.738)                  (0.426)                  (0.161)                  (0.109)                 
Test of equality of impacts at 25th and
75th percentiles (p-value) (0.296)                  (0.060)                  (0.808)                  (0.674)                 
25th %ile financial development 2.61 2.75 2.20 2.20
(0.005)                  (0.003)                  (0.011)                  (0.018)                 
50th %ile financial development 3.04 3.24 2.49 2.43
(0.006)                  (0.003)                  (0.013)                  (0.023)                 
75th %ile financial development 3.76 4.02 2.89 2.75
(0.009)                  (0.004)                  (0.021)                  (0.035)                 
Test of equality of impacts at 25th and
75th percentiles (p-value) (0.063)                  (0.033)                  (0.209)                  (0.290)                 
25th %ile financial development 9.34 9.67 8.30 8.15
(0.010)                  (0.002)                  (0.003)                  (0.005)                 
50th %ile financial development 8.09 7.88 8.47 7.77
(0.071)                  (0.034)                  (0.011)                  (0.030)                 
75th %ile financial development 7.14 6.50 8.62 7.44
(0.194)                  (0.137)                  (0.032)                  (0.083)                 
Test of equality of impacts at 25th and
75th percentiles (p-value) (0.520)                  (0.103)                  (0.871)                  (0.734)                 
25th %ile financial development 2.14 2.48 2.32 2.66
(0.241)                  (0.253)                  (0.274)                  (0.278)                 
50th %ile financial development 2.65 3.02 2.61 2.96
(0.229)                  (0.240)                  (0.293)                  (0.303)                 
75th %ile financial development 3.03 3.43 2.85 3.21
(0.224)                  (0.235)                  (0.307)                  (0.321)                 
Test of equality of impacts at 25th and
75th percentiles (p-value) (0.235)                  (0.225)                  (0.467)                  (0.508)                 
Notes
1/ P-values in parentheses
Impact of terms of trade volatility on growth volatility, 
countries with developed stock markets
Impact of inflation volatility on growth volatility, countries 
with developed stock markets
6-period                 
Impact of terms of trade volatility on growth 
volatility,countries with less developed stock markets
Impact of terms of inflation volatility on growth volatility, 
countries with less developed stock marketsAppendix Table 1:  Countries Included in Sample
High income (24)
1
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Great Britain, 
Greece, Ireland, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand,
Portugal, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland, United States
Upper-middle income (8)
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Mauritius, Malaysia, South Africa, Uruguay 
Lower-middle income (18)
Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Fiji, Jordan, Sri Lanka, 
Morocco, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Swaziland, Syria,
Thailand, St. Vincent
Low income (13)
Burundi, Bangladesh, Cameroon, Ghana, Haiti, India, Kenya, Lesotho, Nepal, Pakistan, 
Sierra Leone, Congo (Zaire), Zimbabwe
1 Income groups according to the World Development Indicators database.Appendix Table 2:  Definitions and Sources of Data
Variable Definition Source
Sd GDP growth  Within-period standard deviation of 
annual change in ln(Real GDP per 
capita) 
World Bank, World Development 
Indicators database (WDI)
Real GDP per capita 1995 dollars WDI
Openess Sum of real exports and imports as 
share of real GDP
WDI
Private credit  Claims on the private sector by 
financial intermediaries as share of 
GDP
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine 
(2000)
Stock market Dummy variable that takes value one 
if market capitalization as share of 
GDP, averaged over 1975-97, is larger 
than the sample median (13.5%)
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine 
(2000)
Sd ToT changes Within-period standard deviation of 
the annual change in the ratio of 
import and export price indices
WDI
Sd inflation Within-period standard deviation of 
the December-to-December change in 
the consumer price index
WDI
Legal origin Dummies indicating source of legal 
tradition (British, French, German, 
Scandinavian, Socialist)
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1999)
Commodity exporter Dummy indicating primary exports 
comprise more than half of total 
exports
WDI
Urban Urban share of population WDI